
**2015 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Main Committee II

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2015, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Istrate (Romania)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General exchange of views (continued)

1. **Ms. Del Sol** (Cuba) said that Cuba rejected the selective approach and double standards that some States were trying to impose on the international community in addressing non-proliferation. Priority should not be given to preventing horizontal proliferation while ignoring the dangers of vertical proliferation; the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons were the only guarantee against proliferation. The growing number of costly programmes to enhance and modernize existing nuclear weapons and the development of new weapons were of grave concern. Non-proliferation must be dealt with through diplomatic means and related measures must be adopted within the framework of international law, relevant conventions and the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons conferred on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fundamental roles in terms of verification and safeguards. It was the responsibility of States members of IAEA to ensure that the Agency's Statute was respected and to prevent interference in its activities, especially with regard to the verifications process, that could undermine its effectiveness and credibility. Cuba therefore rejected all attempts to manipulate IAEA safeguards for geopolitical purposes or to involve the Security Council in an area which fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Agency.

3. Cuba complied fully with its obligations under the Treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocol thereto concluded with IAEA. The satisfactory results of the several inspections that had been conducted by the Agency demonstrated the country's firm commitment to the non-proliferation regime. The Agency could thus give assurances that nuclear material from declared activities was not being diverted to other uses and that there was no undeclared nuclear material in the country. Cuba also contributed to the IAEA illicit trafficking database and had not recorded any incidents involving nuclear material.

4. The 2015 Review Conference must reaffirm the inalienable rights of all States parties to research, development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. Cuba

rejected all attempts to introduce conditions for the exercise of those rights, including making purely voluntary decisions for access to technical assistance mandatory. Blocking legitimate programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy contravened the spirit and letter of the Treaty and hindered the ability of IAEA to fulfil its mandate effectively.

5. As a proud constituent of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, established under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and in the light of the recent proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace, Cuba supported the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and promote disarmament. Cuba urged nuclear powers to withdraw all their interpretative declarations to Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which amounted to reservations prohibited by the Treaty, and to respect the denuclearized nature of the region.

6. Her delegation reiterated its support for the establishment, without delay, of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The failure to convene the conference for the establishment of such a zone was unacceptable. The conference should be convened at the earliest opportunity in 2015.

7. **Mr. Przenioslo** (Poland) said that all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were equally important and should be implemented in a balanced manner. Full compliance with commitments remained an essential element of the Treaty's entire architecture. The IAEA safeguards system and, in particular, the additional protocol, represented the highest standard of verification and protection. His delegation called on all States which had not yet concluded an additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement to do so as soon as possible, and strongly supported efforts towards the full universalization of that instrument. It also encouraged all States parties to fully cooperate with the Agency by, inter alia, hosting its various missions.

8. His delegation supported export control initiatives aimed at sharing best practices and lessons learned, including through the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). With regard to the Iranian nuclear programme, the negotiating

parties' willingness to reach a comprehensive agreement gave hope that relations between Iran and its foreign partners would be restored soon. His delegation hoped that the agreement would have a positive impact on the entire Middle East region.

9. Poland continued to support all efforts of cooperation between IAEA and Iran and noted with satisfaction the resumption of technical meetings between the two parties. His Government hoped that the dialogue would help resolve, as soon as possible, all outstanding issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme. His delegation fully supported the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and called on all concerned States parties to engage in further talks to that end.

10. Poland condemned the nuclear and ballistic missile tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which were in violation of international norms and commitments, and urged that country to return to the Treaty and IAEA safeguards as a non-nuclear State. He hoped that the present Conference would find consensus on the issue of withdrawal, and that the rights provided for in article 10 of the Treaty would not be misused.

11. **Ms. Hulan** (Canada) said that the integrity of the Treaty and the security, prosperity and development benefits flowing from it were dependent on the fulfilment of obligations contained therein. Central among those was the obligation for States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and to put in place export controls. Canada welcomed and actively supported the Agency's continued efforts to improve safeguards implementation in order to strengthen the Treaty's effectiveness.

12. A comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol thereto were the verification standard, providing the Agency with the basis to draw comprehensive conclusions as to the peaceful nature of a State's nuclear programme. Her delegation commended the 124 States parties which had accepted that standard to date, of which 53 had attained and maintained the threshold that enabled IAEA to draw its safeguards conclusions. Canada encouraged the remaining 71 States to continue working to attain such levels in the nearest future.

13. As full compliance with the safeguards agreement was an obligation under the Treaty, Canada remained

deeply concerned about unresolved cases of non-compliance. It urged States parties to consider how they could collectively ensure compliance by Iran, North Korea and Syria with their non-proliferation obligations. The resolutions brought against Iran did not stem from any pursuit of civilian uses of nuclear energy, but rather from its undeclared nuclear fuel cycle, its failure to deliver on promises of cooperation with the Agency and to implement modified Code 3.1 of its safeguards agreement, and its unwillingness to account for potentially ongoing nuclear weapons-related activities.

14. Her delegation was particularly concerned that Iran continued to ignore the binding requirement of the Security Council to take the necessary steps to fully implement its safeguards agreement and the additional protocol thereto. Although Iran might have been fulfilling its commitments under the joint plan of action it had concluded with the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, and despite repeated high-level assurances of cooperation, it was still not cooperating with IAEA inspectors, in particular with regard to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

15. In the light of that country's two-decades-long history of concealing nuclear activities and failure to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supported the 10 Security Council resolutions and 12 IAEA resolutions brought against it. Until Iran had verifiably addressed the international community's well-founded concerns about its nuclear intentions, the Canadian sanctions regime against it would remain in full force.

16. Canada remained deeply troubled that North Korea continued to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and strongly condemned its continued provocations. It was also gravely concerned by the continued signs of activity at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which suggested that North Korea continued to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Canada deplored that country's unrelenting proliferation activities abroad and called on the international community to work towards strengthening its collective counter-proliferation regimes to stymie further development of weapons of mass destruction by that State. Canada had implemented all United Nations sanctions and a robust array of domestic sanctions against North Korea.

International sanctions should not be eased until North Korea took concrete and irreversible steps towards denuclearization and worked towards becoming a responsible international partner.

17. Her Government urged North Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to reengage in the Treaty's review cycle, to abide by its comprehensive safeguards agreement, and to fulfil all its relevant non-proliferation and disarmament obligations without delay. It appreciated the readiness of IAEA to monitor nuclear activities in North Korea, including uranium enrichment. North Korea must refrain from further provocative acts, including nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and re-join the international non-proliferation community by fully renouncing its nuclear weapons aspirations. Efforts to resolve non-compliance by Syria had been largely overshadowed by the protracted civil war and security situation in that country. Nevertheless, Syria must cooperate with the Agency by allowing it to investigate the Dair Alzour site and other related sites as soon as possible.

18. The present Review Conference must reaffirm the fundamental necessity of full compliance with article III of the Treaty. Canada supported the implementation of the 1995 resolution on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and the 2010 decision to convene a conference on the establishment of such a zone. However, a nuclear-weapon-free zone must be the result of the collective efforts of all the States in the region and could not be imposed from the outside or without a consensus.

19. All States parties must exercise vigilance with regard to nuclear export controls. Canada continued to recognize the importance of the Zangger Committee and encouraged all States parties to adopt its memorandums of understanding. The Nuclear Suppliers' Group also continued to play a particularly useful role in that regard. She drew attention to the working paper submitted by the Vienna Group of 10 ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.1](#)), which would make a useful contribution to the Committee's deliberations.

20. **Mr. Ulyanov** (Russian Federation) said that significant progress had been made in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme, including the mutual understanding reached with Iran, which gave hope for a successful outcome by 30 June 2015. However, it was premature to say that all challenges to

the nuclear non-proliferation regime had been overcome. In particular, the North Korean nuclear issue could only be resolved by political and diplomatic means within the framework of the Six-Party Talks.

21. His delegation remained particularly concerned about the nuclear-sharing missions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. During those missions, representatives of non-nuclear-weapon States acquired skills to use nuclear weapons and participated in nuclear planning processes, which his Government considered a blatant violation of articles I and II of the Treaty. Claims that such practices had existed for more than 40 years were without merit. His delegation called on the concerned nuclear and non-nuclear States members of NATO to end that practice as soon as possible and to align their policies with the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

22. In assessing the progress made with regard to the convening of a conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, it was necessary to closely examine the documents submitted by various parties, particularly the one submitted by the Arab Group. That document proposed a fundamentally new approach for the conference, which was justified by the overall dissatisfaction with the current situation. His delegation wished to become better acquainted with the Arab Group's arguments and to hear out other countries' positions before forming an opinion on the issue, and did not exclude the possibility of introducing changes in the mandate for convening the conference. Any improvements must aim to advance practical measures for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. To that end, all States in the region should participate, including those which had not yet acceded to key international non-proliferation agreements.

23. States parties' trust in IAEA safeguards was crucial to the stability of the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and had always been grounded in the objectivity, technical validity and political neutrality of the Agency's monitoring mechanism. The Agency must continue to reflect those qualities and its policymaking bodies must monitor the activities of its secretariat and making decisions once they detect non-compliance with the Treaty by any State party. Such monitoring activity must continue to focus on materials

and objects that could pose a threat to non-proliferation. How third-party information on potential violations of non-proliferation obligations should be treated was of special significance. Treating such information with care would help prevent ungrounded accusations against States parties.

24. His delegation noted with satisfaction that, as a result of extensive discussions, the safeguards system had undergone substantial changes, with the incorporation of the opinions of States members of the Agency. To eliminate any remaining questions and concerns, the Agency's secretariat should ensure the greatest transparency possible when introducing changes to safeguards implementation procedure. It should regularly inform the Agency's policymaking bodies of any steps planned in that regard, and should modify the safeguards system solely with their approval. His delegation expected the IAEA Director General to submit a new comprehensive report on the concept of State-level safeguards implementation currently being developed.

25. **Mr. Hansen** (Australia), speaking on behalf of the Vienna Group of Ten, said that States parties should maintain and reinforce common understandings on strengthening the effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's safeguards system and dealing effectively with non-compliance and proliferation issues and the risk posed by non-State actors seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and materials or related items. Those challenges should be met firmly in a way that upheld the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the IAEA safeguards system. In that connection, the Group had submitted a working paper ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.1](#)) that addressed issues such as compliance and verification, export controls, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, nuclear security and withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty". He hoped the paper would encourage discussion and substantive progress on those issues.

26. The sections of the paper containing recommendations on compliance and verification, export controls, nuclear security and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were directly relevant to the Committee's work. Each section proposed specific draft review language which had been carefully selected with other States parties' positions in mind. Given that the Vienna Group represented a wide range of perspectives on nuclear themes, substantive negotiations and compromises

were necessary to reach a consensus. The Group hoped that its recommendations and supporting background notes would be helpful to the Committee's work.

27. **Ms. Kennedy** (United States of America) said that, although the States attending Review Conferences came with a wide range of priorities and political perspectives, a broad convergence of interests lay at the heart of the bargain implicit in the Treaty, which remained a key instrument for the promotion of security and development for all its States parties. The pillars of the Treaty were mutually reinforcing, and measures that impeded proliferation made it more likely that progress could be achieved on disarmament. It was unlikely that any State would eliminate all its nuclear weapons while other States sought to acquire them, or that it would cooperate in civil nuclear applications without robust safeguards to prevent the use of those applications in weapons programmes. Non-proliferation was therefore a key prerequisite for achieving the fullest possible exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

28. IAEA safeguards provided vital assurances that States did not possess clandestine nuclear programmes and that materials and technology used in civil nuclear programmes were not being diverted for military purposes. The United States accepted the same safeguards measures on its civil nuclear facilities as non-nuclear-weapon States parties were required to accept under the Treaty and the additional protocol system. Only facilities, activities, locations and information of direct national security significance to the United States were excluded from that oversight regime. Nearly 300 facilities in the country could therefore be investigated under the IAEA safeguards system and, in 2015, the United States would report on more than 300 locations and activities under the terms of its additional protocol.

29. IAEA safeguards, which had been developed in response to past proliferation challenges, must continue to evolve in a way that respected their basic purposes and principles. They must remain technically credible, impartial and effective, despite the increasing demands that were being placed on IAEA resources. In that connection, the Agency must be provided with the financial resources and technical support it needed to carry out essential projects, including laboratory upgrades, to fulfil its mandate in Iran and other countries, and to address evolving challenges. States must also support IAEA by adopting and fully

implementing the highest safeguards standards, which had proven essential both in providing assurances of compliance and in identifying and responding to cases of non-compliance. States that violated the Treaty must be held accountable.

30. Export controls were another essential element of the non-proliferation pillar and must remain flexible so as to keep pace with evolving proliferation challenges. Many States required assistance in order to be able to enforce effective measures to control materials, equipment and dual-use technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction, and to implement sanctions imposed by the United Nations in response to non-compliance with the Treaty.

31. Although the threat of nuclear war had abated since the end of the cold war, proliferation risks remained and the threat of nuclear terrorism had grown. Concerted international efforts were required to reduce vulnerabilities and implement necessary protective measures. To that end, the first Nuclear Security Summit had been convened in 2010 to give greater impetus to worldwide efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and prevent illicit trafficking. Five years later, that collective effort had succeeded in securing over two and a half tons of nuclear material that could be used in nuclear weapons, including through the removal of all highly enriched uranium from 11 countries and Taiwan.

32. Some developing countries with limited resources found it difficult to mobilize the resources needed to implement effective safeguards, export controls and nuclear security measures. Although only modest resources were required by States with limited nuclear activities, significant resources were required by States pursuing more advanced nuclear programmes. The United States, together with IAEA and other stakeholders, therefore provided assistance to certain States to ensure that a lack of resources did not prevent them from realizing the benefits of peaceful nuclear programmes. She urged all States that were in a position to provide assistance in that area to do so, and all States that needed assistance to take advantage of the resources made available for that purpose by other stakeholders.

33. The position of NATO with regard to nuclear weapons had been addressed during the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NATO basing

arrangements were fully compatible with the organization's member States' obligations under the Treaty, and United States weapons assigned to NATO remained under United States control at all times.

34. **Mr. Ibrahim** (Malaysia) said that Malaysia was firmly committed to upholding its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty, and had supported several non-proliferation initiatives outside the framework of the Treaty. Significant progress had been achieved on actions related to nuclear non-proliferation contained in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol I)). However, only limited progress had been made in connection with actions related to nuclear disarmament. In addition, non-nuclear-weapon States parties were being held to increasingly stringent non-proliferation standards by nuclear-weapon States, both inside and outside the Treaty regime. The imbalance between disarmament and non-proliferation remained a contentious issue that successive Review Conferences had failed to address.

35. Malaysia adhered to its nuclear safeguards and verification regime, and emphasized the central role of IAEA in establishing and implementing effective safeguards and verification mechanisms to ensure that nuclear energy was being used for peaceful purposes. His Government welcomed regular IAEA inspections at its TRIGA PUSPATI reactor — the only nuclear research reactor in the country. The safeguards verification process should be implemented in a professional, non-discriminatory, objective and transparent manner, based solely on technical facts and credible information. Furthermore, in order to ensure respect for the sovereignty of States, IAEA must strengthen its mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality of safeguards-related information. The IAEA secretariat must be provided with the resources and facilities it needed to fulfil its mandate effectively and objectively.

36. Malaysia also engaged in capacity-building activities with regard to non-proliferation, safeguards and verification in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Asia-Pacific regions. As a national security support centre, Malaysia would continue to work with IAEA to share experiences and disseminate best practices within the region. It fully supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East and looked forward to further progress in that regard in the Committee's deliberations.

37. **Mr. Philips** (United Kingdom) said that, even though nuclear proliferation remained a matter of concern in certain regions, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had helped to reduce regional tensions and foster global stability. His Government remained committed to strengthening the non-proliferation framework, combating programmes of concern and building trust between neighbours. It would continue to work to bring those States closer to the international non-proliferation mainstream, and urged all non-States parties to sign and ratify the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States at the earliest opportunity.

38. In April 2015, the United Kingdom had taken part in the talks which had led to the establishment of the parameters of a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme. It would continue to work closely with the other parties to those talks to finalize all details on that agreement by the end of June 2015. It welcomed adherence by Iran to its nuclear-related commitments under the joint plan of action, fully supported efforts by IAEA to verify those commitments, and urged Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues, including with regard to possible military dimensions.

39. His Government condemned in the strongest possible terms the continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that country's recent threats to carry out a fourth nuclear test. North Korea must refrain from all actions that would lead to further violations of Security Council resolutions, honour its commitments under the joint statement of 19 September 2005, and abandon all nuclear weapons and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The United Kingdom also deplored ongoing non-compliance by Syria with its nuclear safeguards obligations. Syria must cooperate fully with IAEA by immediately providing access to the information, documentation, sites, material and personnel that had been requested by the Agency.

40. The United Kingdom fully supported the continued evolution of the safeguards system, as exemplified by the development of the State-level concept, and hoped that the current Review Conference would support the gradual implementation of that concept by IAEA. It called on States that had not yet done so to sign and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible; it also called on the

Review Conference to endorse the position that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with IAEA should constitute the universal verification norm.

41. Strengthening nuclear security and preventing terrorists and non-State actors from acquiring nuclear material were key aspects of an effective non-proliferation system. The United Kingdom looked forward to supporting the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and continued to help States comply fully with that resolution. States that had not ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, its 2005 Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism should do so the earliest opportunity.

42. His Government was actively supporting preparations for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, and welcomed the publication of IAEA guidelines on the security of nuclear information. It had contributed more than £12 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since 2010, and urged States that were able to provide contributions to do so. It also continued to support the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

43. In October 2011, the United Kingdom had been the first nuclear-weapon State to receive a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service, which had concluded that the country's civil nuclear security was robust. It actively supported efforts by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to curb nuclear proliferation while ensuring that States could access nuclear technology for peaceful uses. During the previous review cycle, his Government had provided significant technical expertise to facilitate the Group's fundamental review of its control lists and would continue to provide support to ensure that those control lists reflected changing proliferation threats. All States should adhere to the Group's guidelines and ensure that its control lists were taken into consideration when making decisions on nuclear and nuclear-related exports.

44. His Government supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and found it regrettable that the conference on the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East had not been held. It continued to work with the relevant stakeholders to ensure that the

conference was convened. In that connection, it had contributed more than £200,000 to the office of the facilitator in the previous two years and had funded a series of projects to support the establishment of the zone, including events organized by civil society to build trust between the key stakeholders and a technical project to consider the necessary properties and verification measures.

45. The United Kingdom welcomed the fact that Israel and the Arab States had attended five informal meetings in Switzerland in 2013 and 2014, commended their substantive contributions and their willingness to negotiate in good faith, and encouraged them to attend a further round of consultations with a view to narrowing differences on arrangements for the conference.

46. **Mr. Motta Pinto Coelho** (Brazil) said that the success of the Treaty should be judged by the extent to which States complied with the terms of the compromise upon which it was based. In that connection, the persistent implementation gap between the non-proliferation and disarmament obligations discredited the Treaty and threatened to undermine the basis on which it had been formulated. Non-proliferation had been the most successful of the Treaty's three pillars. With a single exception, none of the States that had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States had built or acquired nuclear weapons. Brazil continued to support efforts by IAEA to promote more efficient and effective safeguards, in strict accordance with the legal frameworks established between Member States and the Agency, and welcomed, in particular, the intensive consultation process between IAEA and States to clarify the State-level concept.

47. Three years prior to the approval of the Model Additional Protocol, Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and IAEA had concluded an agreement whereby the two countries' nuclear programmes were subject to a double safeguards verification system. It was thus striking that nuclear-weapon States and States that were members of military alliances based on the use of nuclear weapons were once again making suggestions which, if adopted, would widen the present implementation gap and aggravate the Treaty's inherent imbalance and discriminatory nature. Of particular concern were the suggestions that an additional protocol and a

comprehensive safeguards agreement should constitute the verification standard under article III of the Treaty, and that the conclusion of an additional protocol should be a prerequisite for the supply of nuclear materials to non-nuclear-weapon States.

48. Articles III.1 and III.4 of the Treaty had clearly articulated that the verification standard was the standard enshrined in the comprehensive safeguards agreements negotiated between States and IAEA. Although some States decided to take steps to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their safeguards or signed and ratified an additional protocol, States were not obliged to do so in order to comply with the Treaty. For an additional protocol to become part of the "verification standard" the Treaty would need to be amended. Similarly, the suggestion that an additional protocol should be made a precondition for supplying goods and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States had no legal basis and, if endorsed, would run counter to the letter and spirit of article IV.2 of the Treaty. States parties should therefore reject those suggestions.

49. The current Review Conference should recognize that the Treaty had been highly successful in promoting non-proliferation and, for that to continue, no State could continue to rely on nuclear weapons for its security. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons was the only way to eliminate the incentive to acquire them. The Review Conference must urge all States that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA, and encourage the Agency to assist States in that endeavour. It should also recommend that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly, and that measures aimed at further strengthening their effectiveness should be considered in close consultation and coordination with Member States.

50. The Conference should also recognize that nuclear-weapon States possessed the largest stockpiles of nuclear materials, which were not subject to multilaterally verified accounting and control. It should call for the application of IAEA safeguards to be extended to cover nuclear materials in nuclear-weapon States and in States that were not parties to the Treaty; and encourage States parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, in accordance with

article IV, without the imposition of conditions that were not specified in the Treaty.

51. The postponement of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was regrettable. As the successful convening of that conference was an integral part of the Treaty, maintaining the status quo and failing to convene that conference would undermine the progress that had been achieved in the area of non-proliferation. The conference must be held at the earliest possible opportunity and attended by all States of the region without exception.

52. **Mr. Ibrahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Middle East was the region most negatively affected by the protection extended to Israel, which made it possible for that country to retain its nuclear arsenal, continue its occupation of Arab land and reject all initiatives to foster regional peace, security and stability. All States parties to the Treaty must strive with the same degree of seriousness and commitment to implement all resolutions and decisions adopted by the Review Conferences, including the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Nuclear-weapon States, in particular, must assume all their responsibilities under the Treaty.

53. The possession of nuclear weapons by any State in the Middle East constituted a threat to the people of the region and beyond, and undermined regional and global stability. Although the Syrian Arab Republic and other regional States had acceded to the Treaty, Israel obstinately refused to do likewise or to place its nuclear facilities under an IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime. Instead, it ignored all international resolutions and, with the support of certain nuclear-weapon States, continued to strengthen its nuclear arsenal, which comprised over 200 nuclear warheads.

54. In December 2003, as a member of the Security Council and in line with its long-standing belief in the importance of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, Syria had submitted a draft resolution to the Council to further the achievement of that objective. Although certain States that supported Israel had blocked the adoption of the draft resolution, Syria continued to hope that those States would adopt more positive positions, abide by their obligations and reject

policies characterized by double standards. The establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as called for in United Nations resolutions, would necessitate the accession by Israel to the Treaty and international oversight of all its nuclear installations.

55. It was extremely regrettable that it had not yet been possible to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, owing the refusal by Israel to attend the conference, which was tacitly supported by certain States, even as they continued to pay lip service to the idea of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. His delegation called for the current Review Conference to take tangible steps to ensure that the conference was held by the end of 2015. As long as Israel maintained its nuclear arsenal, it would be impossible for the countries and people of the Middle East and beyond to live in peace and security and escape the threat of a nuclear attack.

56. **Mr. Cong Fu** (China) said that strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and eliminating the risk of nuclear proliferation was in the common interest and the joint responsibility of the international community. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and played a key role in preventing nuclear proliferation and maintaining international peace and security. China was ready to join the international community's common effort to prevent nuclear proliferation, and hoped that both the symptoms and root causes of the phenomenon would be addressed in a holistic manner at the current Review Conference, taking into consideration the States parties' legitimate security concerns. Such an approach was not only the best way to eliminate the danger of nuclear non-proliferation, but also a prerequisite for advancing the Treaty.

57. Concerns regarding nuclear-weapon proliferation should be addressed through political and diplomatic dialogue within the framework of existing international law and on the basis of equality and mutual respect. Parties should refrain from using or threatening to use force, adopting double or multiple standards, and pursuing other agendas in the name of non-proliferation. The fairness and legitimacy of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be guaranteed and its authority and effectiveness strengthened. States parties should work together to ensure that their obligations under the Treaty were

honoured in a comprehensive, faithful and balanced manner, and that no judgments were made of the non-proliferation measures implemented on the basis of close or distant relations among States parties. Multilateralism should be upheld and the fair, legitimate and non-discriminatory nature of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime continuously strengthened on the basis of universal participation and democratic decision-making.

58. States which had not yet done so must adhere to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The United Nations and other relevant international organizations and agencies must be brought into play in that effort. The universality of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols must be promoted. The efforts of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group should also be supported.

59. The relationship between non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be balanced. Preventing nuclear weapon proliferation would help to create a global security environment in which mankind could truly benefit from nuclear energy. Promoting the development of nuclear energy could, in turn, contribute to the achievement of non-proliferation goals. The non-proliferation regime should not sabotage States parties' legitimate right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the same time, States parties should honour their obligations under the Treaty instead of carrying out proliferation activities under the pretext of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

60. China was committed to enhancing the universality, effectiveness and integrity of the Treaty. It firmly rejected nuclear weapon proliferation in any form by conscientiously honouring its international obligations and effectively implementing relevant Security Council resolutions. It had also continuously improved and strengthened its legal framework and export control legislation in order to guarantee effective enforcement of non-proliferation policies. It always respected and supported efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with regional conditions and on the basis of voluntary agreements.

61. His Government had ratified the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and was ready to sign the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as early as

possible and without reservations. The Government had always taken a responsible approach to and participated in international non-proliferation efforts, and had made relentless efforts towards settling nuclear issues in certain regions.

62. China had always advocated a peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation and respected the right of Iran to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the Treaty. His delegation welcomed the establishment of key parameters for a joint comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme, and hoped that the final agreement would be fair, neutrally beneficial and aimed towards a win-win outcome. As one of the parties involved in the negotiations, China had been closely engaged with all concerned parties and had put forth a variety of proposals from a non-biased, fair and responsible perspective. His Government would continue to play a constructive role in the negotiations with a view to contributing positively towards a comprehensive, lasting and proper solution of the Iranian nuclear issue.

63. China had consistently worked towards a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula and was firmly opposed to nuclear proliferation in that region. It firmly believed that peace and security on the peninsula should be maintained and the relevant issues resolved through dialogue and consultation. The Six-Party Talks remained the most realistic and effective means to that end; all parties should therefore continue to create conditions for their resumption.

64. China regretted that the conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had not taken place, and expressed its full understanding and support for the legitimate concerns of Arab countries. Once established, such a zone would help ease tension in the region and enhance regional and global peace and security. The international community should continue to place emphasis on and support the establishment of such a zone, and ensure that the conference was not delayed indefinitely.

65. His delegation welcomed the working papers submitted by the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned States parties and called on all concerned parties to fully demonstrate their political will in order to allow the present Review Conference to make consensual decisions and lay down conditions for an early

convening of the international conference. China was ready to actively participate in and provide all necessary support for that process. The comprehensive working paper it had submitted (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.36) contained proposals for preventing nuclear-weapon proliferation. He hoped to see those proposals reflected in the final document of the Review Conference.

66. **Mr. Najafi** (Iran) said that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. Accordingly, nuclear disarmament remained the main objective and the highest priority. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons derived its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament and could neither be regarded as an independent objective nor reduced to preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States. His Government recognized the importance of the non-proliferation objective and the accomplishments made in that regard. However, it believed that overemphasizing non-proliferation at the price of nuclear disarmament was both misleading and counterproductive.

67. Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were mutually reinforcing, but only if the non-proliferation efforts were accompanied by practical steps aimed at nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation measures should in no way restrict the exercise of States parties' inalienable right to use and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon-sharing between nuclear-weapon States and between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, as was currently taking place within a certain military alliance, was a clear violation of the concerned States parties' explicit obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty. The present Review Conference should address that ongoing violation, which undermined the credibility of the Treaty.

68. His delegation was also gravely concerned that all nuclear-weapon States were modernizing or upgrading their nuclear weapon arsenals and that some of those States were developing new types of such weapons, including new types of tactical nuclear weapons that reduced the threshold for and increased the possibility and risk of their use. That trend continued to adversely affect the effectiveness of the Treaty and should be addressed by the present Review Conference.

69. In order to be effective, non-proliferation measures should help to reduce the number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use, limit their geographical scope, and advance the overall objective of nuclear disarmament. His delegation was alarmed that certain States parties attempted to use non-proliferation as a pretext to restrict, directly or indirectly, other States parties' inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All such measures should be considered clear violations of the Treaty and their persistence would continue to hamper States parties' economic and technological development and international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

70. While the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world was another achievement under the non-proliferation pillar, it could not be a substitute for the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons and was not sufficient for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Other roadblocks to the establishment of such a world included the refusal by certain nuclear-weapon States to grant legally binding security assurances to all the parties to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the lack of political will by certain non-parties to the Treaty towards establishing such zones, as exemplified by the Israeli regime's refusal to participate in the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

71. Iran attached great importance to and strongly supported the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, which it had first proposed in 1974. It had called for the timely implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, which included a decision to convene a conference on establishing such a zone. Iran had taken many steps towards that end, some of which were reflected in the national report it had submitted to the 2015 Review Conference. It had engaged constructively in several rounds of consultations with the facilitator of the conference on establishing a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and had officially declared its decision to participate in that conference, which had been scheduled for 2012. While deeply disappointed with the failure to convene that conference, Iran strongly rejected all justifications raised by certain conveners. The failure to hold that conference violated the collective agreement reached at the 2010 Review

Conference and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

72. Israel continued to be the only obstacle to establishing a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. The establishment of such a zone would require its prompt and unconditional accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. The international community must exert sustained pressure on Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear activities and installations under IAEA safeguards. Realization of the Treaty's fundamental objectives required the prompt and full implementation of the decisions adopted at previous Review Conferences. Iran recommended that the 2015 Review Conference should consider the urgent implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan.

73. Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, he said that, as a State member of NATO, Canada continued to support the use of nuclear weapons against other countries, while the international community had already acknowledged that any use of nuclear weapons was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. Its record of assisting non-States parties to the Treaty in developing nuclear weapons was well known and had even recently been condemned by its own civil society, which considered it a violation of the Government's legal obligations under the Treaty. Moreover, its deadly silence on the threat posed to the Middle East and beyond by the nuclear weapons of the Zionist regime of Israel indicated the hypocritical nature of its nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy. While Iran fully supported the Non-Aligned States parties' proposal on that issue, it recommended that the 2015 Review Conference should incorporate the aforementioned elements in its decisions on the Middle East and the non-proliferation of nuclear-weapons.

74. **Mr. Laggner** (Switzerland) said that nuclear non-proliferation raised crucial questions on international stability, which was the reason it remained one of the priorities of Swiss foreign policy. The balance and compromise upon which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was based were being increasingly undermined. As his delegation had demonstrated in Main Committee I, the results of nuclear disarmament were insufficient and the fact that nuclear weapons lay at the heart of nuclear-weapon States' security doctrines could encourage other States to acquire them.

75. Because any acquisition of nuclear weapons made the world less safe, Switzerland supported strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol should become the safeguards standard and a universal non-proliferation instrument. Switzerland welcomed the progress made towards resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, and was convinced that only diplomacy could resolve such matters. It hoped that the progress achieved would inspire parties seeking to resolve other nuclear non-proliferation issues, particularly the situation on the Korean peninsula.

76. To encourage States to continue optimizing the safeguards system, the State-level concept should deliver tangible and quantifiable results, particularly in the case of States which had implemented comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. That concept provided a unique opportunity to redefine the relationship of trust between IAEA and its member States. The time was right to demonstrate that the State-level approach entailed real benefits.

77. Although almost all States had adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there were still States that were unlikely to accede to it in the near future. States parties must continue working on strengthening non-proliferation on the global level and on finding creative solutions to enable non-States parties to adhere to equivalent non-proliferation standards. A global nuclear non-proliferation regime must include all States possessing the capacity to develop nuclear technologies. Switzerland thus called on those States to adopt binding and internationally recognized nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament standards, which was the most realistic approach for the establishment of standards supported by all States parties.

78. Export control groups played a key role in reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear Suppliers' Group, in particular, promoted the implementation of article III by drawing up lists of nuclear and dual-use assets — a strategy which had also proven useful in implementing national export control laws following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Switzerland therefore encouraged all States parties, and especially those with significant technological capacities, to comply with the Nuclear Suppliers' Group guidelines. His Government supported the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass

destruction, and invited the concerned parties to approach that issue in a spirit of cooperation at the present Review Conference.

79. **Mr. Rosnes** (Norway) said that the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2013 were a clear violation of its international obligations. Concerns also lingered about the Iranian and Syrian nuclear programmes. However, the progress achieved in the political dialogue on the Iranian nuclear programme was encouraging. Norway welcomed the political agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany and fully supported the parties' continued efforts to reach a comprehensive and verifiable agreement by 30 June 2015. Norway supported the verification work of IAEA and had thus far donated over 12 million Norwegian kroner to that end. It also supported the framework for cooperation between the Agency and Iran, which addressed concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme.

80. States parties must further strengthen the Agency, given its clear and critical role in securing non-proliferation. They should reach the common understanding that the comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols protected their collective security and facilitated peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation welcomed the progress achieved on the State-level concept and, particularly, the improvements in its effectiveness and efficiency, given the expected growth in nuclear energy. His delegation called on all countries, and especially the Annex 2 countries, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for it to come into effect. It was also important to complete the International Monitoring System and ensure that the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization had the necessary funding to develop and maintain the System.

81. Nuclear security was crucial to achieving further progress in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international non-proliferation. The Nuclear Security Summits had contributed substantially to maintaining nuclear security and keeping fissile material beyond the reach of terrorists. His delegation welcomed the IAEA ministerial meeting on nuclear security and wished for the Agency to have a role in international cooperation efforts to secure all fissile material. States parties must intensify efforts to sustain existing

regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones and establish new ones. The establishment of a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free-zone was a welcome step forward. The international community must move towards a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The Vienna Group of Ten, of which Norway was a member, had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.1), which offered valuable and practical guidance on non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

82. **Mr. Al-Saad** (Saudi Arabia) said that although the Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which remained the bedrock of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, had not been fully implemented by certain States, all members of the international community must acknowledge the legal and ethical dimensions of the Treaty and affirm that peace and security could not be achieved through the possession of weapons of mass destruction, but only through consultation and cooperation, by facilitating development among countries, and preventing a nuclear arms race.

83. His delegation hoped that the working paper submitted by the Arab Group (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.33) would be given due consideration by the Review Conference, including, in particular, by the States of the Middle East. Failure to make progress towards implementing the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East might spur countries to engage in a nuclear arms race.

84. Saudi Arabia supported all efforts to promote non-proliferation — a matter of great importance in the Middle East, where the Israeli nuclear arsenal continued to threaten peace and security, and where another country aspired to acquire nuclear weapons. That country's nuclear ambitions were a source of great concern, as were its interference in other countries' internal affairs and its arming of certain militias and forces with a view to destabilizing the region and frustrating all efforts to reach settlements that would promote peace, security and development. That country had been arming the Houthi militia in Yemen since 2009 and, in response to an appeal for assistance by Abdrabuh Hadi Mansour, the legitimate president of Yemen, Saudi Arabia and its Arab partners had taken action to save the Yemeni people from the onslaught launched against them by that militia. That country must immediately withdraw from the areas of Yemen that it had occupied and hand over its weapons

to the legitimate Government, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2216 (2015).

85. **Ms. Andamo** (Thailand) said that the global non-proliferation regime must be strengthened, including within the context of the Treaty. Strong international safeguards and verification arrangements under the auspices of IAEA would help build confidence among States parties. Nuclear-weapon-free zones played a key role in supporting global non-proliferation efforts. It was therefore regrettable that it had not yet been possible to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Thailand strongly urged the relevant States parties to comply with their obligations under the Treaty to promote long-term regional peace and security.

86. Effective and strong partnerships and networks aimed at promoting non-proliferation, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative, enhanced coordination in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons and related materials by non-State actors, and demonstrated that there was a strong political commitment to achieve non-proliferation goals. Further efforts were needed to ensure that States complied fully with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). IAEA must continue to play its pivotal role in ensuring the physical security of nuclear materials and in assisting Member States in their efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

87. Thailand had proven that it could address both traditional and non-traditional threats to peace and security by adopting a multi-stakeholder approach. A more critical and creative approach to non-proliferation should be adopted, involving all segments of society, including the private sector, industry, academia and civil society, at the national, regional and international levels.

88. **Ms. Martinic** (Argentina) said that her country was firmly committed to the international non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The IAEA safeguards system was a vital component of that regime, as it provided assurances that States were complying with their non-proliferation obligations. In that connection, Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and IAEA had concluded an agreement whereby the two countries' nuclear programmes were placed under safeguards that

exceeded those established under article III of the Treaty.

89. Argentina was the only developing country that participated in all export control regimes, enabling it to maintain the highest possible non-proliferation standards. Since June 2014, it had presided over the Nuclear Suppliers' Group; it also strongly supported the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which played a vital role in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their acquisition by non-State actors. All States must fulfil their obligation to submit national reports to that Committee and must seek to promote international cooperation, particularly with a view to addressing asymmetries in capacity. In that regard, the specific needs of States should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

90. Argentina welcomed the progress that had been achieved in the negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, which had established the basis for a balanced solution and strengthened the principle of resolving disputes peacefully through negotiation.

91. **Ms. van Deelen** (Netherlands) said that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the gravest threats to international peace and security; the international community must therefore adopt a resolute stance in its efforts to address current proliferation challenges. The Netherlands welcomed the framework agreement concluded between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany; it fully supported those countries' ongoing efforts to reach a comprehensive, long-term settlement that would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme; and urged the parties to conclude a comprehensive agreement by 30 June 2015. Verifying the implementation of that future agreement was essential for international confidence to be restored; Iran must therefore cooperate fully with IAEA to address all outstanding issues, including those related to any possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

92. Developments in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were of deep concern to the Netherlands, which strongly condemned that country's nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches as a blatant violation of its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. That country should return to full compliance with the Treaty, comply with all its other

international obligations swiftly and unconditionally, and refrain from any further provocative actions. The Netherlands also urged the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with IAEA, inter alia, by complying fully with its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

93. The IAEA safeguards system was a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty. All States parties must conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and sign an additional protocol with the Agency. The Netherlands welcomed the progress that had been achieved on the implementation of additional protocols since the 2010 Review Conference and called for that verification standard to be recognized in the outcomes of the 2015 Review Conference. In that regard, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative had proposed that nuclear-weapon States should place any of their nuclear materials that they identified as excess to military requirements under an IAEA verification regime at the earliest opportunity, to ensure that they could never again be used for military purposes. All States parties must, moreover, ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not directly or indirectly facilitate the development of nuclear weapons. Effective export controls were crucial for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depended on a climate of confidence.

94. It was regrettable that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had not taken place as anticipated. The Netherlands would continue to support efforts by all stakeholders to make progress in that regard, and called on all States of the region to engage in a spirit of constructive cooperation that would lead to an inclusive, substantive and goal-oriented conference. It hoped that the working papers submitted to the Conference on that issue would facilitate constructive discussion.

95. **Mr. Alokly** (Libya) said that the process to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones should be accelerated with a view to achieving the objectives of the Treaty. In that connection, the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was of crucial importance, and its implementation should be seen as an integral part of the agreement on the indefinite extension of the Treaty. It was therefore most regrettable that it had not yet been possible to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

96. Peace and stability in the Middle East could not be achieved while Israel insisted on maintaining its nuclear weapons. Israel was the only State in the region that obstinately refused to accede to the Treaty. The international community, particularly the Treaty's depository States, must urge Israel to do so as a non-nuclear-weapon State without further delay, place all its nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA safeguards, and eliminate its nuclear arsenal, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

97. All nuclear-weapon States must also provide assurances that they would not help or encourage any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or explosive nuclear devices, in accordance with article I of the Treaty. Furthermore, pursuant to the preamble and article IV of the Treaty, all States parties must prevent the transfer of equipment, materials or information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to any non-State party.

98. **Ms. Hulan** (Canada), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that she felt compelled to respond to the surprising comments of the representative of Iran. Canada complied fully with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its non-proliferation credentials were impeccable. It had concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement and signed an additional protocol with IAEA. In 2005, the Agency had concluded that all nuclear material in Canada was used for peaceful purposes, providing the highest level of confidence that Canada was in compliance with its commitments under the Treaty. Canada had, in fact, achieved the highest possible level of compliance under the Treaty that a State could attain. That was a direct result of its strong support for the IAEA safeguards regime and its high level of cooperation with the Agency in the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Furthermore, Canada fully upheld its obligations under the Treaty as a member of NATO, as had been clearly articulated by other delegations. Canada remained in full compliance with all its obligations under the Treaty and would continue to cooperate with the Agency.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.